David J. Kalupahana The Buddhist conceptions of "subject" and "object" and their moral implications Thomas Nagel begins his recent work, The View from Nowhere (Oxford, 1986), with a criticism of the perennial search for objectivity not only in relation to our conception of the object, but also to our conceptions of the subject as well as the moral life. Philosophers, starting with the obvious distinction between subjective life and objective experience, have moved in different directions in formulating their views of the world. The pendulum has swung in different directions. If we start from the subjective side, we are said to be confronted with the problems of skepticism, idealism, or solipsism. If we are to begin with the objective side, we are faced with a different set of problems. We need to accommodate the individual and his perspective as well as the perspectives of others in a world that is generally looked upon as being neutral, objective, and perspectiveless. Nagel focuses on the second approach.
concept which the community of philosophers, leaving all their prejudices behind, were able to analyze and for which they could assign publicly verifiable meaning. In that process the ghost in the machine was eliminated along with certain parts of the machine. This positivistic approach is what contributed to the behavioristic model of explanation adopted by the psychologists with a scientific bent of mind, and which is now being challenged by people like Nagel. In the ancient Indian tradition, a similar attempt to eliminate the Upanisadic version of the "ghost in the machine" led to an equally positivistic doctrine propounded by the Materialists. For the Materialists, the objective reality consists not simply of matter, but also of the principle that governs the behavior of material bodies. This mysterious principle is referred to as "nature" (svabhdva). 4 As in the positivist tradition in the West, the Materialists were enthusiastic about eliminating not only the "ghost in the machine", but even a part of the machine, that is, the psychological and moral experiences of humanity.
Nagel would be pleased to learn that his problem was also the Buddha's problem, even though the solutions are not the same. The Buddha was confronted with theories, some of which were the results of individual perspective (ditthi), like those of the Upanisadic thinkers, and some others which supposedly avoided any such individual perspective (aditthi), like those of the Materialists.5 No doubt, the middle path between the two extremes of individual perspective and no perspective is not an easily circumscribed perspective so long as our attempt is to achieve ultimate objectivity. This means that there is something radically wrong with our search for ultimate objectivity itself.
The first attempt on the part of the Buddha was to avoid the search for ultimate objectivity regarding the subject. This is one aspect of his doctrine of nonself or nonsoul (anatta). It is intended to get rid of the "ghost in the machine" without, at the same time, abandoning any part of the machine. The machine is 292 Kalupahana the psycho-physical personality consisting of the five basic constituents, the physical body (rtupa), feeling or sensation (vedand), perception (saiin), dispositions (sahkhdra), and consciousness (viKiindna).6 These are not radically distinguishable ultimate elements. Instead, they represent five mutually dependent aspects of the conscious human personality.
The Buddha's definition of the physical body has objective as well as subjective features. Objectively, it is made up of the four primary elements (mahdbhuta) and the derived elements (updddya-rupa).7 Subjectively, it represents the function of being affected. This function is explained by the use of the verb ruppati, "is affected," in the definition of the concept of rupa or physical form.8 This twofold definition, objective and subjective, enabled the Buddha to retain the physical personality as necessary condition for the objective identification of a human person, while at the same time allowing that objective personality to be related to the subjective aspects of human life. The Buddha seems to be reluctant to speak of a human person independent of a physical organism. A purely immaterial (ariipa) personality is a mental fabrication (manomaya).9 Physical identification is thus one of the important means of preserving the objectivity of the human person. The sensations and perceptions, understood in a nonreductive way, account for the shared experiences of human beings. Being dependent upon the physical personality for their occurrence, these sensational and perceptual experiences have their limitations. Such limitations provide the occasion for the generation of what the Buddha called dispositions (sahkhdra), and these dispositions represent a watershed between the subjective and objective aspects of the self. Serving as the most important factor in the individuation of a human personality, the dispositions account for the fact of subjectivity. At the same time, by placing its indelible impression upon the objectively identifiable physical personality as well as the commonly shared sensations and perceptions, these dispositions enable a human person to reveal the objectivity of that subjective self. The Buddha's explanation of this most significant aspect of the personality reads as follows:
Disposition is so called because it processes material form (rupa),... feeling (vedand),... perception (sanna),... disposition (sahkhara),... consciousness (vinnina), which has already been dispositionally conditioned, into its present form. 0
In other words, the personality consisting of the five aggregates that has come to be as a result of past dispositional conditioning (abhisahkhatam) is continually provided with an individuality or unity by the activity of the dispositions.
According to Nagel, "We are in a sense trying to climb outside of our own minds, an effort that some would regard as insane and that I regard as philosophically fundamental."11 For the Buddha, such stepping out can be achieved only by a careful examination of the dispositional tendencies that 293 bring about the unity as well as the individuality of a person. The individual is not merely a "bundle of perceptions," but also a bundle that is integrated by the dispositional tendencies.
Finally, we are left with the problem of re-identification. The physical body certainly helps in the objective re-identification of the human personality. Yet that objective re-identification can turn out to be extremely superficial and could be even misleading if we are to ignore the re-identification that takes place subjectively on the basis of consciousness (viinnna). The Buddha characterized this constant process of re-identification as the "stream of consciousness" (viinninasota),12 an idea that was to become the central theme of William James when he tried to dispose of the metaphysical conception of self. 13 Once again, the dispositions (sahkhira) that are responsible for the individuation of the subjective stream of consciousness also turn out to be the mirror through which the objectivity of that stream is reflected. It is for this reason that the Buddha combined the dispositions and the stream of consciousness to speak of the "stream of becoming" (bhavasota),'4 which is another way of explaining the psychophysical personality.
The The process is presented in three steps and has led to much confusion and misunderstanding among Buddhist scholars. The three steps may be explained as follows:
1. Personal existence = ontological commitment or the attempt to reach ultimate objectivity. 2. No personal existence = deconstruction or the abandoning of that ultimate objectivity. 3. Therefore, "personal existence" (in quotes) = reconstruction or restatement without ontological commitment, that is, the recognition that it is mere conception.
Similarly, Nagarjuna emphasized the appeasement of the methods of self and selfhood (atmitmani-naya).22 So did Vasubandhu when he identified the objectivity-seeking faculty of mind (manas) as the generator of the four kinds of defilements: self-view, self-love, self-pride, and self-confusion. 23 With this explanation of the human personality or the subject, it will be possible to move on to the Buddhist conception of the object. The Buddhist view of the object bears little resemblance to what is available in the more recent philosophical traditions, and may even appear to be rather exotic, especially after the Western tradition has come to bury the contributions of a philosopher like George Berkeley.
To return to Nagel: "The aim of objectivity would be to reach a conception of the world, including oneself, which involved one's own point of view not es-sentially, but only instrumentally, so to speak: so that the form of our understanding would be specific to ours, but its contents would not be." 24 In spite of Nagel's attempt in the earlier part of the book to remain satisfied with limited objectivity, especially in the explanation of the human self, ethics, and science, he seems to be determined to adopt an extremely rationalist approach toward the object. In contrast to these different theories, including Nagel's, the Buddha, who abandoned the ghost in the human machine with his theory of nonself (anatta), was, for the sake of consistency as well as for epistemological reasons, equally prepared to renounce any conception of mystery associated with the objective world. According to him, just as much as stepping outside of oneself will enable one to understand and appreciate the truth about the individual subject, a similar stepping out of the object will be conducive to the better understanding and appreciation of the object itself. This is the reason for the Buddha's extension of the doctrine of nonself (anatta) to the objective world as well. The demystification of the self or the desolidification of the concept of self went hand in hand with the demystification and desolidification of the concept of the object.
In order to restrain the tendency toward solidification of the objective experience into incorruptible and ultimately real objects, the Buddha recommended the adoption of a perspective that resembles the Berkeleyan method in Western philosophy. According to Buddhism, in the meditations that eventually bring about more accurate knowledge and understanding, the initial as well as the most essential step is the avoidance of the substance/quality or primary/secondary distinction. Explaining the restraint of the sense faculties, the Buddha says: Then, Bahiya, thus must you train yourself: "In the seen there will be just the seen; in the heard just the heard; in the reflected just the reflected; in the cognized just the cognized." That is how, Bahiya, you must train yourself. Now, Bahiya when in the seen there will be to you just the seen;... just the heard;... just the reflected;... just the cognized, then, Bahiya, you will not identify yourself with it. When you do not identify yourself with it, you will not locate yourself therein. When you do not locate yourself therein, it follows that you will have no "here" or "beyond" or "midway between," and this would be the end of suffering.28
This Buddhist approach, however, differs from that of Berkeley in that the elimination of a mysterious substance to account for the identity and the reidentification of the object is not followed by the introduction of an equally mysterious conception of God. The identity as well as the continuity of the object is explained in terms of the principle of dependence (paticcasamuppdda), to which we shall return soon.
As it was with the conception of the subject, we observe in the literature of some of the later Buddhists, especially the Sarvastivadins, an attempt to reify the object. The Sarvastivada conception of substance, denoted by the term svabhtva, a term that was utilized by the positivist Materialists of pre-Buddhist India, is well known to the student of Buddhism. The more prominent philosophers of the tradition mentioned earlier reacted against this conception of the object in the same way as they did with regard to the reification of the subject. Moggaliputta-tissa's Kathavatthu contains one whole chapter devoted to a criticism of the Sarvastivada notion of existence (atthitd).29 The Vajracchediki utilizes the method of deconstruction and reconstruction mentioned earlier in treating the problem of the object or "the element of the world" (lokadhdtu).30 Following the Buddha's admonition relating to the restraint of the senses, referred to earlier, Nagarjuna concludes his analysis of the objective elements (dhdtu) encouraging the appeasement of the conception of the object (drastavopasama).31 Similarly, the psychologist Vasubandhu reminds his readers that here the subject of discourse is a "conception of the object" (visaya-vijnapti).3 2 Reification of concepts, whether these pertained to the subject or the object, has been a pervasive tendency among most philosophers. The Buddhist doctrines of the nonsubstantiality of the person (pudgala-nairdtmya) and the non-substantiality of elements (dharma-nairdtmya) served as two powerful fenders against the constantly emerging hazards of reification.
For the Buddha, the constant attempt to introduce a mysterious substance in the explanation of the subjective life as well as objective experience is the work of the tender-minded. The tender-minded are the victims of anxiety (paritassand) in relation to things that do not exist either subjectively or objectively.33 The tough-minded approach is to renounce the search for "things as they are" and confine oneself to what is given, that is, "things as they have come to be" (yathabhutam).34
Vasubandhu's characterization of the object as a concept (vijnapti) is rather significant, for with it he is focusing attention on one of the most significant theoretical solutions to the problem of objectivity attempted by the Buddha. We have already pointed out the manner in which the Buddha described a concept (sahkhd) as something that is neither ultimately subjective nor ultimately objective. We also compared the Buddha's view of concepts with that of William James. A conception is thus distinguishable from imagination or daydreaming. Vasubandhu clarifies the status of conception thus: "The determination of mutually related concepts is based upon mutual domination (or dependence). In dream experience thought is overwhelmed by torpor. Hence the difference in fruit."35 A genuine concept is not simply the arbitrary creation of the individual's mind; it is also dependent upon the object of experience as well as recognition and agreement by a community of intelligent human beings. Looking upon conception in this manner, the Buddha was able to step outside both the subject and the object. It also enabled him to deal with new situations and new perspectives without falling into any dogmatic slumber. Dogmatism (ditthi) is the result of allowing the vehicle of conception, namely, the concept, to be solidified through a process of reification.
James struck a similar note when he maintained: "The facts are unquestionable; our knowledge does grow and change by rational and inward processes, as well as by empirical discoveries. Where the discoveries are empirical, no one pretends that the propulsive agency, the force that makes the knowledge develop, is mere conception."36 Unfortunately, James was unaware that the Buddhist psychologist of the fourth century A.C., Vasubandhu, had compiled a whole treatise entitled the "Establishment of Mere Conception" (Vijnaptimatratdsiddhi), not to justify any form of idealism, but to elaborate upon the Buddha's view of conception as a means of stepping outside the metaphysical subject (pudgala-nairdtmya) as well as the metaphysical object (dharma-nairdtmya).37 Here again, Vasubandhu was preceded by his illustrious co-religionist, Nagarjuna, who equated conception (prajnapti) with dependent arising (pratTtyasamutpdda), for it is a way of emptying the subject and object of substantialist implications (=emptiness, sutnyata) and representing a middle standpoint between extremes (madhyamdpratipat).38
If the negative doctrine of nonsubstantialism (andtmavdda) that represents a stepping outside of both subject and object may sound unfamiliar to the modern Western student of philosophy, more cumbersome is the positive doctrine of dependent arising (pratTtyasamutpdda). Yet, it can be understood in terms of the more familiar category of causation provided one is prepared to shed the substantialist or essentialist perspectives.
Skepticism regarding causal explanations, especially in the area of perceptual experience, is rampant in the traditional Indian schools as well as in some of the modern Western philosophical traditions. Once again such skepticism is the result of the pursuit of excess objectivity that Nagel is complaining about. In the modern world, the most prominent advocate of such skepticism has been Bertrand Russell. Nagel expresses this dilemma when he says: "The same ideas that make the pursuit of objectivity seem necessary for knowledge make both objectivity and knowledge seem, on reflection, unattainable."39 This dilemma is inevitable so long as we deal with an objectivity that is excessive to the point of being absolute, while human knowledge remains undeniably limited and relative. If objectivity is not as excessive and absolute, skepticism may not appear to be so troublesome.
Here the problem is created by the science of logic that derived its inspiration from the two-valued logic of Aristotle. In this particular system, which incidentally is not so alien to the traditional Indian logical system, where absolutism reigned supreme in discussions relating to 'existence', it is possible to speak of the true and the false distinction appearing in the following form. If the statement "all swans are white" is true, the statement "some swans are not white" is false in the sense that the latter contradicts the former. Here, the term "all" (sarvam) is used in an absolute sense. Thus, whenever there is a need to account for possibilities (which may be otherwise), it is necessary to introduce counterfactual after counterfactual, an attempt that some modern philosophers now look upon as being futile. 40 The Buddha was clearly aware of the problems relating to the absolutist conception of "all" or "everything" (sabbam). His empiricism as well as his explanation of conception, as mentioned earlier, prevented him from absolutizing even the conception of "all." Questioned by a metaphysician by the name of Janussoni specifically on the problem of "all" (sabbam), the Buddha replied that as far as he was concerned "all" meant the eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and smell, tongue and taste, body and tangible, mind and concept-that is, the six forms of sense experience. Pressed by Janussoni with questions regarding other definitions of "all," the Buddha insisted that he would avoid any such definition, the reason being that they would be beyond experience (avisaya).4 It is for this reason that whenever the Buddha was compelled to utilize universal terms, that is, to use the conception of "all," he, as far as we can know from the available discourses, always qualified it as "all this" (sabbam idam). Modern Buddhist scholars, misled by medieval Hindu thinkers like Udayana Acarya, have failed to realize the epistemological significance of this qualification. This qualification, as I have pointed out elsewhere, is faithfully followed by a disciple like Nagarjuna.42 It is also clearly reflected in Vasubandhu's description of reality as "this is a mere concept" (vijnaptimatram evaitad). 43 The avoidance of any absolutistic notions of truth does not mean the wholehearted sponsorship of skepticism, either in its absolute form as reflected in a philosopher like Sanijaya or in its less severe form portrayed in the Jaina logic of syddvdda, where everything is a possibility or a "maybe," until the attainment of "omniscience" (kaivalya). The difficulty consists in discovering a middle path between these extremes. In the first place, the Buddha had to admit that every rational human being needs to recognize certain things as being true and others as being false. Otherwise human life would be chaotic. Therefore, to the question as to whether there is a variety of truths (regarding the same matter), the Buddha declared that "truth is one and there is no second" When that exists, this comes to be; on the arising of that, this arises. When that does not exist, this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this ceases. 51
It may be noted that the second statement of the preceding quotation serves the function of a counterfactual.
What is most important in the preceding analysis is that the truth value of a concept, a statement, or a proposition is determined on a contextual basis rather than in an absolute way. This has important bearings on the Buddhist theory of linguistic convention, a subject that is outside the scope of the present article. We will focus our attention on its significance in the area of ethics or moral discourse.
In the Upanisads, while the search for ultimate objectivity reached its culmination in the conception of dtman, the ultimate reality of the subject as well as the object, a similar search in the area of ethics gave rise to the conception of brahman.52 Brahman was the source of the fourfold caste system. The creation of the dharma or the moral law being subsequent to the creation of the caste system, the latter is seen to take precedence over the former. Therefore, the caste specifies the duty which serves as the foundation of morality. This conception of duty came to be elaborated in the Bhagavadgita, where its ontological status is preserved leaving no room for the human perspective.
The Buddha was inclined to use the term dharma to refer to the moral ideal, since he had very little sympathy with the Hindu caste system, which gave meaning to the Upanisadic term brahman. For him, the term dharma, used in an ethical sense, denoted good, in both its concrete and its ideal forms.53 Its negation, a-dharma, meant bad or evil. For the Buddha, good is what produces good consequences (attha),54 and such consequences are dependently arisen, that is, they depend upon various factors operating within each context.A pragmatic criterion of good, therefore, has to be contextual as well. For this reason, dharma as the moral ideal was never looked upon as an Absolute. Indeed, grasping on to any conception of good as the ultimately real, the universally valid, and eternally existent is criticized by the Buddha. This idea is clearly expressed by him in his discourse on the "snake simile" addressed to a monk named Arittha, available both in Pali and Chinese.55 He insists that a person has to "abandon even the good, let alone evil." Utilizing an appropriate simile, the simile of the raft (kulla), the Buddha argues that a person builds a raft only for the purpose of crossing over a stream. If, after crossing over, the person were to carry the raft on his shoulders wherever he goes, insisting that the raft was useful and, therefore, he should not abandon it, that person would not understand the function of the raft.56 This means that the usefulness of the raft is contextual and concrete. Apart from the context, the raft has no meaning, and it is not possessed of absolute value. The pragmatist James struck a similar note when he said that "there is always a pinch between the actual and the ideal which can be gotten rid of by leaving part of the ideal behind." 57 What does the Buddha mean by abandoning the good? Most scholars take this to mean the transcendence of both good and evil and the attainment of an ineffable state comparable to the brahman. If this interpretation is correct, it would mean that the epistemology and the conceptual analysis which were adopted in determining the subject and object are inappropriate in the sphere of moral discourse, and the Buddha can be rightly accused of being inconsistent. Therefore, "abandoning the good" needs to be understood in a totally different way.
The raw materials on the basis of which we arrived at a reasonable conception of a human person were subjective as well as objective. Similar facts served as the raw material for our conception of the object. The very same epistemology and conception call for the preservation of three factors in arriving at any conception of morality. These are: (1) the conception of the individual human person, which we have already arrived at as a viable philosophical concept without having to sacrifice the human perspective; (2) the conception of the objective world, including other human persons, for objectivity is not completely abandoned, and (3) the reality of new and varying contextual situations (that is, the possibilities) that continue to unfold before humanity as a result of dependent arising and which needs to be accounted for. These constitute the raw material that goes to produce a reasonable conception whenever human beings are called upon to make moral decisions or judgments.
Thus, a reasonable moral judgment will require a careful decision regarding the manner in which we incorporate any one of these factors whenever that particular factor becomes relevant to the situation without ruling it out beforehand. This can be done only when we realize that, as in the case of factual
